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Sentencing primary caregivers of young children
Traditionally a judicial officer was not required to consider the effects 
of the imposed sentence on the children of the offender, even if the 
offender was a primary caregiver of young children. The Court in S v M 
(Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) [2007 
(12) BCLR 1312] (discussed in detail in Mujuzi (2011) 2 SACJ 164–177) 
held that, in sentencing primary caregivers of young children, courts 
should inquire into the effects the sentence will have on such children 
and, where possible, impose a non-custodial sentence to ensure that 
the children are not deprived of the care and support of the primary 
caregiver.
In MS v S (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2011 (2) SACR 88 
(CC) the Constitutional Court dealt with the question of imprisoning 
a primary caregiver of young children. Mrs S pleaded guilty and was 
convicted by the regional court of forgery, uttering and fraud (at para 4). 
She pleaded in mitigation that she had committed the offences as ‘a 
result of paying for her daughter’s medical fees’ as ‘her children require 
special care’ (at para 5). A pre-sentencing report prepared for the state 
after interviews with Mrs S’s previous employer and her husband’s 
    
       
family portrayed her as ‘manipulative, dishonest, greedy, sly and as a 
troublemaker, who drank alcohol in excess. It also presented her as 
being irresponsible in the management of her finances.’ The report 
also found that ‘should a custodial sentence be imposed, there would 
be an adequate family support system to care for the children, and 
that Mrs S’s mother-in-law would assist Mr S to care for the children’ 
(ibid). On the counts of forgery and uttering she was sentenced to 
two years’ imprisonment, conditionally suspended for five years. On 
the count of fraud she was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in 
terms of s 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act (at para 7). This 
means that the Commissioner or the parole board had the discretion to 
place Mrs S on correctional supervision. ‘In determining her sentence, 
the court took into account that Mrs S’s mother-in-law had agreed to 
assist Mr S to look after the children’ (at para 7). Mrs S’s appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was dismissed. It should be noted that the 
High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal also considered the evidence 
of Mrs S’s social worker, whose report portrayed Mrs S as ‘a loving and 
caring mother who maintained gainful employment in order to provide 
for the family’ (at para 12). Mrs S’s argument before the Constitutional 
Court was that (at para 23; see also para 30 for other arguments):
‘…the courts did not consider the interests of the children when they 
considered her sentence… [T]hat the regional court did not take heed of the 
best interests of the minor children in terms of s 28 of the Constitution, in that 
no inquiry was conducted to establish if Mrs S was a primary caregiver. Had 
this inquiry been conducted … a custodial sentence would not have been 
imposed, as its imposition would render the children without a caregiver…’.
Counsel for the state argued that this case was distinguishable from 
S v M in a sense that Mr S was available to take care of the children 
should Mrs S be imprisoned (at para 26; see also para 33). However, 
counsel for Mrs S submitted that the evidence of Mrs S’s social worker 
‘had established that Mr S was prevaricating about shouldering the 
responsibility of caring for the children, that his mother was no longer 
available and willing to assist in the care of the children, and that 
incarcerating Mrs S would be so traumatic as to deleteriously affect 
the interests of the children’ (at para 32). At the request of the amicus 
curiae (at para 27) the Constitutional Court appointed a curator ad 
litem whose report showed, inter alia, that Mrs S’s daughter was 8 years 
old and in Grade 3 and that the son was 5 years old and Grade R. The 
curator’s report also showed that the educational psychologists and the 
school headmistress had informed her that ‘Mrs S is the primary source 
of the children’s emotional security and attends to their day-to-day 
activities, such as preparing them for school and collecting them from 
school.’ The report also indicated that Mrs S’s imprisonment would 
‘have a deleterious effect’ on the children’s ‘emotional and material 
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development’ (at para 42). Critically, the curator’s report concluded 
that (at para 43):
‘Mrs S’s mother-in-law, who used to take care of the children periodically, has 
indicated her inability to do so because she now suffers from osteo-arthritis 
and back pain. In the meantime, Mrs S has improved her position in life since 
she committed the crime, and has become a valued employee and devoted 
parent. Her employer has indicated that it would not be able to keep open 
her position in the event of her incarceration. Mr S earns R8 500 per month. 
He is unable on his own, and without the additional income of Mrs S, to 
pay for the children’s tuition fees, medical expenses and daily necessities. 
Although he reportedly loves his children, he cannot pay someone to assist 
him with the care of the children. He works long hours, from 05h00 until 
19h00, from Monday to Friday. Mr S’s employer has advised that he cannot 
alter the working hours of Mr S. Mrs S has also recited the health problems 
of her children and their special needs arising from their illnesses. Following 
the withdrawal of their paternal grandmother, there is no one to take care of 
the children, if Mrs S is incarcerated.’
Khampepe J, who wrote the minority judgment, had ‘grave difficulties 
with whether the regional court, being convinced that the custodial 
sentence was the only appropriate sentence to impose, gave due 
consideration to the adequacy of care the children would receive while 
Mrs S is incarcerated’ (at para 35). Responding to the state counsel’s 
submission that ‘Mr S and his family also undertook to care for the 
children’ (at para 35) she was of the view that (at para 36)
‘[a]ccepting that the court’s attention was drawn to the need to provide 
alternative care for the children…, the court was required to investigate 
the effect the sentence would have on the children. The court did not fully 
investigate the quality of alternative care the children would receive.’
The Court should have enquired into whether there was a person 
that would look after the children’s daily needs during their mother’s 
incarceration. This was so especially in the light of the fact that Mrs S’s 
mother was not staying in the same house as the children. The court 
should also have investigated whether there was someone who would 
take the children to school and who would fetch them from school 
and also how the children would remain in contact with their mother 
should she be imprisoned. There was also evidence that Mr S was 
not the suitable person to provide the care that the children needed. 
Examples were given which showed that there had been cases where 
he had neglected his family. He had for example neglected his family 
and even when he was at home his role with regard to maintaining the 
children was insignificant (see paras 36–38).
Khampepe J considered the following factors to hold that a sentence 
of correctional supervision should be imposed on Mrs S: Mr S would 
not be available to take care of the children appropriately (due to 
his work-related commitments and the fact that he was not known to 
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have been involved in taking care of the children); Mrs S had been 
employed gainfully and her employer had made it clear that she would 
lose her job if she was to be incarcerated; that Mrs S’s mother-in-law 
was no longer available to take care of the children (she was suffering 
from ill-health); that Mrs S had not committed a violent crime; and that 
South African prisons were overcrowded and therefore unsuitable for 
rehabilitation (at paras 49–52).
The majority judgment was written by Cameron J with whom eight 
other judges concurred. The majority pointed out that Mrs S was a 
recidivist who had continued re-offending while under the threat of 
suspended sentences (at paras 55 – 56). The majority pointed out that 
because of Mrs S’s recidivist nature and personal circumstances, the 
regional court was correct in imposing the sentence in terms of s 276(1)
(i), because that court considered imprisonment to be ‘essential’ but 
at the same time the circumstances pointed ‘away from an extended 
sentence’ (at para 57). The majority held that the reports submitted 
by the probation officer and Mrs S’s social worker established that the 
incarceration of Mrs S ‘would be hard’ on her children (at para 60). 
The majority held (at para 63) that unlike in S v M,
Mrs S is not the children’s sole caregiver. She is not ‘almost totally responsible’ 
for their care. Despite heartache and turbulence, well captured in her 
evidence and in the social workers’ reports, Mrs S is united with the father 
of her children. He is their co-resident parent. And he is willing to care 
for them during her incarceration. Although he works long hours, there is 
nothing to indicate that he will not be able to engage the childcare resources 
needed to ensure that the children are well looked after during his absence 
at work. A non-custodial sentence is therefore not necessary to ensure their 
nurturing. And a custodial sentence will not inappropriately compromise the 
children’s best interests. The sentencing court … properly balanced out the 
constitutional interests at stake.
The majority also found that the reports did not suggest that ‘the 
fundamental needs of the basic interests of the children will be 
neglected if their mother is incarcerated’ (at para 64; see also para 65). 
In dismissing the appeal, the majority held that ‘[t]o mitigate the 
possibility of the children enduring hardship during their mother’s 
absence, … this court should order the Department for Correctional 
Services to ensure that a social worker visits them regularly, and that he 
or she provides the department with reports on their wellbeing during 
their mother’s absence’ (at para 66). It is against that background that 
the majority ordered that (at para 68):
‘[t]he National Commissioner for Correctional Services is directed to ensure 
that a social worker in the employ of the Department for Correctional 
Services visits the children of the applicant, Mrs S, at least once every month 
during her incarceration, and submits reports to the office of the National 
Commissioner as to whether the children of the applicant are in need of care 
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and protection as envisaged in s 150 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and, if 
so, to take the steps required by that provision.’
The majority judgment could easily be understood as having paid 
insufficient attention to some of the evidence that was adduced in the 
case. In the first place it seems to have totally ignored the fact that 
there was compelling evidence to show that Mr S would not be in a 
position to appropriately take care of the children. This is because of 
his inflexible work schedule and his history of taking an almost passive 
approach in matters concerning his children. Mr S’s income could 
also not enable him to employ someone to take care of the children. 
The majority also seems to have totally ignored the fact that Mrs S’s 
mother-in-law was no longer available to take care of the children. 
The order by the majority that a social worker should be appointed by 
the Commissioner of Correctional Services to visit the children at least 
once every month is based on at least one assumption: that there will 
be a readily available social worker to undertake that task. This means 
that such a social worker would have to put aside his/her core duty – of 
ensuring that prisoners take part in rehabilitation programmes – and 
visit Mrs S’s children to write a report for the Commissioner.
Both the majority and the minority judgments did not call for 
evidence to throw more light on the extent to which the Commissioner 
or the parole board has in practice used section 276(1)(i). Information 
or data on how many offenders on average are released every year in 
terms of section 276(1)(i) would have helped the court to understand 
how the provision is used in practice and whether Mrs S is in fact 
likely to benefit from that provision. It would also have been helpful 
for the court to hear evidence from, for example, the Department of 
Correctional Services, on what is expected of a prisoner to benefit 
from section 276(1)(i).
Although the Commissioner of Correctional Services has the 
discretion to place Mrs S on parole, that can only happen after she has 
served at least 10 months of the sentence (s 73(7)(a) of the Correctional 
Services Act). This means that even if the Department’s social worker 
informs the Commissioner that Mrs S’s children are suffering as a 
result of the absence of their mother, the Commissioner would not be 
able to place her on correctional supervision before the expiry of the 
stipulated period.
Restorative justice
It is well-known that many South Africa’s prisons are overcrowded 
and therefore not conducive for rehabilitation. As has been illustrated 
elsewhere (Terblanche A guide to sentencing in South Africa (2007) 
174–178), South African courts, including the Constitutional Court, 
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have recognised the importance of restorative justice. The issue in 
the case of DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 (2) SACR 567 (SCA) 
was whether the sentence of restorative justice that had been imposed 
on the respondent for rape was appropriate. The respondent had 
been convicted of raping a girl of 15 years and 10 months old. The 
complainant was the respondent’s girlfriend’s daughter and all three 
lived in the same house.
Both the complainant (who was 17 years old at the time) and her 
mother testified on sentence. The court also heard the evidence of 
a probation officer on the question of the appropriate sentence to 
be imposed. The probation officer informed the court that ‘the 
complainant had outgrown the incident and that she had ‘forgiven and 
reconciled with the respondent.’ The probation officer added that the 
complainant was no longer either angry with the respondent or afraid 
of him. The respondent and the complainant had ‘repaired and mended 
their relationship.’ The complainant did not want the respondent to be 
imprisoned because he was ‘playing a useful role in maintaining her 
and her family’ (at para 6). Although the complainant’s mother wanted 
the respondent to be imprisoned, she testified that the respondent and 
the complainant appeared to have mended their relationship and were 
friendly with each other. She also informed the court that without 
the respondent, who was the breadwinner, life would be difficult (at 
para 7). The social worker testified that through the victim-offender 
conference that she arranged, the complainant and the respondent 
were afforded an opportunity to engage each other and that the two 
had reconciled. The social worker also testified that the respondent 
had rejoined the family and was remorseful. She ‘recommended that 
the respondent be sentenced to correctional supervision in terms of 
s 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act’ (at para 8). A psycho-social 
report on the impact of the offence on the complainant that was 
submitted to the High Court showed that as a result of the rape her 
academic performance at school had deteriorated (at para 9). The High 
Court found 24 factors that constituted substantial and compelling 
circumstances that justified the imposition of a sentence less than the 
prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment. Some of these 
factors were: the accused was remorseful, the rape had ‘occurred on 
the spur of the moment’, the victim was not physically injured, the rape 
was ‘not one of the worst kinds of rape’, the accused supported the 
family including the victim, the accused and the complainant’s mother 
had resumed their relationship, ‘the family was entirely dependent 
on the accused’, the victim was of the view that ‘it would not be in 
the family’s interests that the accused be incarcerated’, ‘the accused 
and the victim participated in a successful victim/offender program’, 
it was not in the interests of society to create secondary victims by 
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the imposition of punishment upon the accused that would leave at 
least five indigent persons dependent upon social grants, and that 
the accused was ‘a good candidate’ for rehabilitation and was able to 
render community service (at para 11).
Counsel for the state argued, inter alia, that ‘the sentence based on 
restorative justice is not appropriate for such an offence as it failed to 
reflect the gravity and seriousness of rape, particularly the rape of a 
15 year old girl … [and that] the sentence imposed by the court below 
had the effect of trivialising the offence.’ On the other hand, counsel 
for the respondent argued that the circumstances of the case were ‘so 
exceptional’ that they justified the court to depart from the prescribed 
minimum sentence and to impose a sentence based on restorative 
justice. They added that this sentence had ‘enabled the family of the 
complainant to reunite with the respondent, thus achieving reparation 
and reconciliation’; that the complainant had accepted the respondent’s 
apology and had forgiven him; that the respondent’s apology had 
resulted in the healing of the wound that had been inflicted on the 
family by his conduct; and that the family was also willing to forgive 
the respondent and reconcile with him (at para 14).
The amicus curiae before the High Court made submissions on the 
importance of restorative justice, although it conceded that rape was 
a serious crime. She submitted that restorative justice requires that 
in determining a suitable sentence, the court should not only hear 
the victim’s voice but that that voice should be ‘accorded appropriate 
weight.’ The amicus curiae added that although the victim deserves 
to be heard in determining a suitable sentence, it is the court with the 
responsibility to determine the sentence (at para 15). The court, after 
highlighting the seriousness of rape (at paras 16–19), held as follows 
(at para 20):
‘Although restorative justice received a somewhat lukewarm reception by 
the judiciary starting tentatively in S v Shilubane 2008 (1) SACR 295 (T) it 
has in the last few years grown in its stature and impact that it has even 
received the approval of the Constitutional Court in Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 
SA 235 (CC), S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232 
(CC), The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride (Johannesburg and others, Amici 
Curiae) 2011 (4) SA 191 (CC). Restorative justice as a viable sentencing 
alternative has been accorded statutory imprimatur in the Child Justice Act 
75 of 2008, in particular s 73 thereof. I have no doubt about the advantages 
of restorative justice as a viable alternative sentencing option provided it is 
applied in appropriate cases. Without attempting to lay down a general rule 
I feel obliged to caution seriously against the use of restorative justice as a 
sentence for serious offences which evoke profound feelings of outrage and 
revulsion amongst law-abiding and right-thinking members of society. An ill-
considered application of restorative justice to an inappropriate case is likely 
to debase it and make it lose its credibility as a viable sentencing option. 
Sentencing officers should be careful not to allow some overzealousness 
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to lead them to impose restorative justice even in cases where it is patently 
unsuitable. It is trite that one of the essential ingredients of a balanced 
sentence is that it must reflect the seriousness of the offence and the natural 
indignation and outrage of the public.’
The court added that there is no doubt that in matters of sentencing 
the victim’s voice deserves to be heard as this gives the court an 
opportunity to know how the victim was affected by the crime 
(at para 21). However, the Court cautioned that the fact that the 
victim’s voice deserves to be heard in determining an appropriate 
sentence ‘does not mean however that his/her views are decisive’ (at 
para 21). The court concluded that, although there were substantial 
and compelling circumstances, such circumstances did not justify 
the imposition of a sentenced based on restorative justice. The 
court added that a sentence should not only deter the accused from 
committing crime but that it should also deter like-minded people 
from committing crime. Imposing lenient sentences for serious crimes 
could erode public confidence in the criminal justice system (at 
para 22). The court upheld the appeal and sentenced the respondent 
to ten years’ imprisonment.
This case raises several issues that are relevant to sentencing but 
the most important points to note for the purposes of this analysis is 
that restorative justice should not be emphasised in serious cases such 
as rape. The case also shows that a court does not have to impose a 
sentence based on restorative justice where such a sentence would 
be inappropriate irrespective of the fact that the victim forgave and 
reconciled with the perpetrator. It has to be recalled that restorative 
justice aims at restoration and reconciliation (Terblanche at 174–178). 
It is unclear why the High Court emphasised restorative justice 
when there was evidence that the respondent reconciled with the 
complainant. The Supreme Court of Appeal also did not point out 
this fact in its judgment. Even if there had not been reconciliation 
between the respondent and the complainant, the imprisonment 
of the respondent did not mean that reconciliation could not have 
taken place (see Stamatakis and Van der Beken ‘Restorative Justice in 
Custodial Settings: Altering the Focus of Imprisonment’ (2011) 24(1) 
Acta Criminologica 44–66). The case also shows that much as the victim 
has a say in as far as the issue of imposing an appropriate sentence 
is concerned, the victim cannot dictate to the court which sentence 
should be imposed. The court has to maintain its independence and 
impartiality at all levels including at the sentencing and ensure that 
the sentence impose fits not only the criminal but also the crime. One 
should also not lose sight of the fact that although in the Criminal 
Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007 specifically provides 
that in the case of rape an ‘apparent lack of physical injury to the 
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complainant’ (s 51(3)(Aa)(ii)) shall not be considered as a substantial 
and compelling circumstance, the High Court considered the fact that 
‘the victim was not injured physically’ to be one of the substantial and 
compelling circumstances. It was held in S v Nkawu 2009 (2) SACR 402 
(E) that s 51(3)(aA)(ii) would be unconstitutional if it compelled courts, 
irrespective of the circumstances of the offence, to ignore the effect 
of the rape on the victim in determining the appropriate sentence, 
as it would be against the doctrine of separation of powers for the 
legislature to prescribe to the judiciary factors that must be adhered 
to sentencing. In the author’s view, although Nkawu raises a valid 
constitutional issue, whether Nkawu was correctly decided or not will 
have to be determined by the Constitutional Court at an appropriate 
time. This is especially because of the fact that it raises the issue of 
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary but does 
not deal with drafting history of the amendment.
Globular sentences
A court has the discretion to determine which sentence to impose 
on the offender depending on the relevant applicable legislative 
provisions (Terblanche at 113–136). In cases where a person has 
been convicted of one offence a court will have two important tasks 
– (1) assessing the mitigating or aggravating factors to determine the 
appropriate sentence; and (2) highlighting the objective or objectives 
that the sentence that has been imposed on the offender aims at 
achieving. These objectives include deterrence, rehabilitation and 
retribution. However, the situation is different in a case where a court 
has to sentence a person who has been convicted of more than one 
offence – for example aggravated robbery and the possession of an 
unlicensed firearm. In a case like that a court has to decide at least 
four issues at sentencing: (1) the mitigating or aggravating factors to 
determine the appropriate sentence; (2) the objective or objectives that 
the sentence that has been imposed aims to achieve; (3) the question 
whether the sentences imposed on each of the offences of which the 
offender has been convicted should run consecutively or concurrently; 
and (4) whether to impose a globular sentence. Although the law does 
not bar courts from imposing globular sentences (Terblanche at 182) 
the Appellate Division cautioned against the practice of imposing 
globular sentences (see S v Immelman 1978 (3) SA 726 (A) at 728–9). 
In S v Ngabase and another 2011 (1) SACR 456 (ECG) the regional court 
convicted each of appellants of robbery with aggravating circumstances 
(two counts) and possession of a dangerous weapon (two counts). The 
High Court, after acquitting the accused of possession of dangerous 
weapons, noted that (at para 22)
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‘[t]he magistrate treated all the offences of which the appellants had been 
convicted as one, and sentenced them to terms of imprisonment of 18 and 
15 years, respectively. The setting-aside of the appellants’ convictions on the 
dangerous-weapons charges must result in the composite sentences being set 
aside. It is apparent…that the magistrate intended imposing punishment in 
respect of each conviction, but was influenced to impose a globular sentence 
by the first appellant’s attorney’s plaintive cry for mercy. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal has repeatedly emphasised that separate counts may be taken 
together for purposes of sentence only in exceptional cases. This is precisely 
the type of case where a globular sentence presents problems on appeal.’
The first appellant was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for each 
of the two convictions of robbery with aggravating circumstances and 
the court ordered that the 12 years of the second sentence should 
run concurrently with the 15 year sentence. The second appellant 
was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. What is emerging from the 
above judgment is that although in practice courts are not prevented 
from imposing globular sentences, these types of sentences are rarely 
imposed and even when they are imposed the appellate court could 
set the sentence aside and impose a specific sentence for each of the 
offence of which the offender has been convicted.
Objectives of punishment
Once a person has been convicted of an offence, the court has to decide 
not only the kind of punishment to be imposed but also the objective of 
that punishment. The court will have to decide, for example, whether the 
punishment will help in the rehabilitation of the offender or will deter 
the offender or other people from committing the offence or offences 
of which the offender has been convicted. There are cases in which an 
offender or offenders have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms and 
the court has not stated the objective that the sentence imposed will 
serve. In S v Ngabase 2011 (1) SACR 456 (ECG), for example, the two 
appellants were convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances 
and sentenced to 15 and 12 years’ imprisonment respectively. The High 
Court held that ‘[g]iven the seriousness of the offences … a lengthy 
term of imprisonment is imperatively called for.’ This was a retributive 
sentence. The court did not inform the offenders that they had been 
sentenced to be rehabilitated or to deter them from committing 
other offences or to deter others from committing offences of that 
nature. Similarly in S v Nkosi 2011 (2) SACR 482 (SCA) the appellants 
were convicted of attempted robbery, attempted murder, unlawful 
possession of two AK47 rifles, unlawful possession of six 9mm pistols 
and possessions of ammunition (at para 4). The appellants were ‘each 
sentenced to an effective term of 22 years’ imprisonment’ (at para 5). 
For reasons not relevant to this analysis, the first appellant’s appeal 
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succeeded and his sentence and conviction were set aside. However, 
the second appellant’s appeal was dismissed. In upholding the sentence 
imposed by the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
the High Court ‘carefully considered all the factors relevant in the 
enquiry — the second appellant’s personal circumstances, the nature 
of the offences involved and the interests of society’ (at para 35). The 
Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that ‘[t]he offences committed in 
this case count among the most violent and, unfortunately, prevalent 
in this country. The harshest form of punishment is undoubtedly 
warranted’ (at para 36). It is evident that the court emphasised the 
fact that the offences committed were very violent, in upholding the 
sentence that had been imposed by the High Court.
In DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 (2) SACR 567 (SCA) the 
respondent was convicted of raping a 15-year and 10-months-old girl 
and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, conditionally suspended for 
five years. The High Court emphasised restorative justice. In setting 
aside the High Court’s sentence and replacing it with one of ten 
years’ direct imprisonment, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that (at 
para 22)
‘[i]t is trite that in addition to deterring an accused person from committing 
the same offence in the future, a sentence must also have the effect of 
deterring like-minded people. Rape of women and young children has 
become cancerous in our society. It is a crime which threatens the very 
foundation of our nascent democracy which is founded on protection and 
promotion of the values of human dignity, equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms. It is such a serious crime that it evokes 
strong feelings of revulsion and outrage amongst all right-thinking and self 
respecting members of society. Our courts have an obligation in imposing 
sentences for such a crime, particularly where it involves young, innocent, 
defenceless and vulnerable girls, to impose the kind of sentences which 
reflect the natural outrage and revulsion felt by law-abiding members of 
society. A failure to do so would regrettably have the effect of eroding the 
public confidence in the criminal justice system.’
It is clear that the Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised the following 
in sentencing the offender: specific deterrence when it said that the 
sentence will deter ‘an accused person from committing the same 
offence in the future’; general deterrence when it held that a ‘sentence 
must also have the effect of deterring like-minded people’ and the 
interests of the society – the protection of the society from people 
like the accused. The Supreme Court of Appeal also appears to have 
highlighted the role of public opinion when it said that a lenient sentence 
‘have the effect of eroding the public confidence in the criminal justice 
system.’ There are at least two points to note about the Supreme Court 
of Appeal holding above: (1) a court can impose a sentence aimed 
at achieving more than one objective of punishment. In this case, 
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the court emphasised deterrence and protection of the society; (2) 
it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court of Appeal holding that a 
‘sentence must also have the effect of deterring like-minded people’ 
from committing the offence or offences of which the offender has 
been convicted is applicable in all cases. It has been demonstrated that 
deterrence has not been proved to deter people from committing crime 
(cf the sources referred to in Terblanche 156–163). It is submitted that 
the above approach is only applicable in a case or cases where a court 
has emphasised general deterrence as the objective of punishment.
In S v Ncube and other 2011 (2) SACR 471 (GSJ) the appellants were 
convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances and sentenced 
to 12 years’ imprisonment. In dismissing their appeal against both 
sentence and conviction, the High Court held as follows (at 480):
‘The crime is an extremely serious one and is recognised as such by reason 
of, inter alia, the obvious features of the crime, but also the fact that a 
minimum period of imprisonment has been considered appropriate by the 
lawmaker, namely 15 years. That is indicative of the order of the period 
of imprisonment which the public expects courts to impose upon persons 
who commit offences of this nature …The needs of society are such that 
frequently perpetrated crimes, and particularly serious crimes of this nature, 
must be met with an appropriate sentence of a sufficiently severe nature 
to deter other persons from becoming embroiled in this type of activity… 
This type of offence is a prevalent one in our present society and steps are 
being taken to stamp it out, hence the minimum sentence legislation and 
the serious efforts made by the police force of this country to arrest, detain 
and deal with perpetrators. The effect of a lengthy period of imprisonment 
also has the added salutary purpose of removing the persons from society, 
thereby preventing them from committing further crimes.’
It is evident that the High Court highlighted the following in upholding 
the sentence: the seriousness of the crime; public opinion (expectation); 
the needs of society; general deterrence; the prevalence of the crime; 
and specific deterrence. This case also illustrates that in imposing a 
sentence, a court can emphasise both specific and general deterrence 
and other factors. Where courts have imposed lengthy prison terms, 
deterrence and/or retribution or both has been emphasised. However, 
as will be illustrated shortly, there are cases that have mentioned the 
fact that by being sentenced to a lengthy prison term, the offender 
will get an opportunity to be rehabilitated while serving his sentence. 
This is so even if courts are aware that many prisons in South Africa 
are overcrowded which makes it difficult or impossible for offenders 
to be rehabilitated.
In a case in which rehabilitation was considered, albeit in passing, 
as the objective of punishment, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not 
impose a custodial sentence. In S v Romer 2011 (2) SACR 153 (SCA) 
the respondent was convicted of a count of murder and two counts 
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of attempted murder and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment that 
were wholly suspended for five years, plus three years’ correctional 
supervision, because he acted with diminished responsibility. The state 
argued that the sentence was ‘disturbingly lenient’ (at para 3) and that 
the ‘trial court over-emphasised the personal circumstances of [the 
respondent] at the expense of the gravity of the crimes committed, the 
interests of society and the interests of the victims’ (at para 24). The 
state argued further that the respondent should have been sentenced to 
15 years’ imprisonment (at para 25). The state added that the sentence 
of correctional supervision ‘had the effect of trivialising the gravity of 
the crimes committed by [the respondent] – with no deterrent effect 
on both [the respondent] himself and other would-be offenders’ and 
that given the gravity of the offences of which the respondent was 
convicted ‘the retribution element of punishment should have been 
brought to the fore’ (at para 27). In disagreeing with the state, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held (at para 27) that
‘[m]ore than a decade ago this court recognised the utility of a sentence of 
correctional supervision. In S v R 1993 (1) SACR 209 (A) Kriegler AJA was at 
pains to point out that the statutory dispensation introduced by s 276(1)(h) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act (viz correctional supervision) was intended to 
distinguish between two types of offender, namely those who ought to be 
removed from society and imprisoned, and those who, although deserving 
of punishment, should not be removed from society. He exhorted judicial 
officers to take advantage of this statutory provision in appropriate cases.’
The Supreme Court of Appeal referred to earlier decisions to hold 
that this was not an appropriate case for the imposition of a deterrent 
sentence because the offender was unlikely to repeat what he did, the 
nature and personal circumstances of the accused did not warrant his 
removal from society, and that the respondent was not a danger to 
society at large (at paras 28–30). After agreeing with the High Court’s 
finding that a non-custodial sentence would help the respondent in 
his rehabilitation (at para 20), the Supreme Court of Appeal concluded 
that it was ‘satisfied, after much anxious consideration, that deterrence 
of [the respondent] or others is not an overriding consideration, 
regard being had to “the concatenation of circumstances” which were 
of a highly unusual, if not bizarre, nature and which are unlikely 
to recur’ (at para 31). The following are some of the points that one 
can distil from the above judgment. First, the state seems to have 
phrased its submissions in a manner that blurred the distinction 
between deterrence and retribution. Although it submitted that the 
imposition of the sentence of correctional supervision would trivialise 
the seriousness of the offence and a deterrent message would not be 
sent out to the offender and the would-be offenders, it concluded by 
arguing that the failure by the High Court to emphasise deterrence 
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meant that the ‘retribution element’ of punishment was not brought 
to the fore. Secondly, the Supreme Court of Appeal seems to hold the 
view that in cases where it is unlikely that the offender will repeat 
the offence of which he has been convicted and where the offender 
poses no threat to society, it serves no purpose to impose a deterrent 
sentence. However, that finding contradicts the conclusion arrived at 
by the same court in DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 (2) SACR 
567 (SCA) where the High Court had imposed a suspended sentence 
for rape after being convinced that it was unlikely that the respondent 
would have committed rape again and after finding that the respondent 
did not pose any danger to society. Thirdly, the decision also highlights 
the fact that there are some prosecutors who still hold the view that 
correctional supervision is not an appropriate sentence irrespective of 
the circumstances in which the offence was committed. It is against 
that background that the Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised the fact 
that correctional supervision is an appropriate sentence depending on 
the circumstances of the offence and the offender.
A similar conclusion was reached in S v Dumba 2011 (2) SACR 5 
(NCK), where the accused was convicted of the murder of his wife. 
In sentencing him to eight years’ imprisonment, three of which were 
suspended for a period of five years (at para 15), the court held that 
the ‘accused is a first offender and is unlikely to commit another 
violent offence’ (at para 12). However, in what could be considered 
as having taken into consideration both public opinion and general 
deterrence, the court concluded that ‘the community – particularly 
the San community – must not be left with the impression that the 
court condones heinous crimes like murder, by them or anyone else’ 
(at para 13).
There are cases in which courts have expressed the view that 
sentencing an offender to imprisonment would help in his rehabilitation. 
In S v Makhaye 2011 (2) SACR 173 (KZN) the appellant, who had a 
previous conviction, was convicted by the regional court of the theft of 
a motor vehicle and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. He appealed 
against conviction and sentence. His appeal against conviction was 
dismissed but his appeal against sentence was upheld and the High 
Court imposed a sentence of five years’ imprisonment of which one 
year was suspended for three years. The High Court held that ‘[t]he 
fact remains that the appellant has been convicted of a serious offence 
and the imposed sentence, while allowing him to rehabilitate himself, 
must also serve as sufficient deterrence not to engage in this type 
of conduct in the future … [A] suitable sentence would be one that 
is subject to the provisions of s 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977’ (at para 11). The High Court expressed the view that 
the sentence imposed on the appellant would serve two objectives – 
Recent cases 411
       
rehabilitation and deterrence (specific deterrence). This is indicative 
of the High Court’s understanding that these seemingly conflicting 
objectives of punishment are not mutually exclusive, especially in the 
context of a sentence imposed in terms of section 276(1)(i) because for 
the Commissioner of Correctional Services or the parole board to place 
a prisoner on parole, one would expect that prisoner to have been 
rehabilitated or for the Commissioner and the Parole Board to be of 
the view that his release with facilitate his rehabilitation.
In S v Makena 2011 (2) SACR 294 (GNP) the accused and his co-
accused were convicted of murder, robbery and housebreaking with 
intent to steal and theft. The cumulative effect of the different sentences 
that were imposed on the appellant was 50 years’ imprisonment (at 
para 3). The High Court emphasised retribution, deterrence and the 
interests of society in imposing the sentence (at para 6). On appeal to 
the full bench, the Court observed that the state counsel had correctly 
conceded that the sentence imposed on the appellant ‘did appear 
to run counter to the judicial trend to strive after rehabilitation and 
reformation as opposed to retribution and prevention’ (at para 11). 
The Court added that one should not overlook ‘the fundamental 
independence of [the Department of] Correctional Services which … 
does not operate from the premise that those convicted by the courts 
and channelled to it are incorrigible and beyond redemption from a 
life of crime, and beyond rehabilitation’ (at para 12). The Court also 
added as follows (at para 13):
‘What has been said about rehabilitation and reformation applies to the 
period of the appellant’s rehabilitation, viewed from the appropriateness or 
otherwise of the imprisonment for 50 years. It is my considered view, based 
on the sentences emanating from the Supreme Court of Appeal, that effective 
sentences exceeding 25 years’ imprisonment are not confirmed lightly. Again, 
the basis for this may be the emphasis on reformation and rehabilitation, 
based, inter alia, on the constitutional precept that punishment should not 
be cruel or be deemed to be such. This statement is made with the full 
knowledge and appreciation of the gravity and devastating effects that the 
loss of the victim’s life has inevitably inflicted on his family, society and the 
country.’
The Court concluded on a positive note that the fact that the accused had 
pleaded guilty to the offences which was ‘the first step to reformation 
and rehabilitation’ and that ‘the psychologists and other experts 
who will plot and vet his future are in place within the Department 
of Correctional Services’ (at para 15). The appellant’s sentence was 
reduced to one of 25 years’ imprisonment. The Makena decision raises 
the following important points: first, the Court was of the view that 
decisions of whether a person is capable or incapable of rehabilitation 
should not be made by courts but rather by the relevant officials in the 
Department of Correctional Services; secondly, there is a trend to the 
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effect that rehabilitation is being emphasised instead of retribution and 
deterrence; thirdly, any punishment imposed on the offender should 
not violate his/her constitutional right to human dignity; fourthly, the 
court assumes that the Department of Correctional Services has enough 
‘psychologists and other experts’ who will put in place programmes 
for the appellant’s rehabilitation; fifthly, that the appellant is likely 
to participate in such programmes; and, finally, that a lengthy prison 
term would enable the appellant to be rehabilitated.
The question whether the above assumptions can be substantiated 
is a difficult one to answer. Although, as indicated above, some courts 
appear to hold the view that the sentences imposed could deter 
offenders from re-offending or other people from offending, it has 
been compellingly argued that deterrence is based on misconceptions 
and that there is no proof that a sentence imposed on one offender can 
actually deter other people from offending (see Terblanche 158–163). 
Although the Department of Correctional Services has taken measures 
to ensure that inmates are rehabilitated (see Department of Correctional 
Services Annual Report 2010/2011 (2011) 19, 20, 22), it is doubtful if the 
offenders sentenced to imprisonment will be rehabilitated especially 
in the light of the fact that the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional 
Services has reported that many correctional centres in South Africa 
are not conducive for rehabilitation and have to be refurbished and 
reconstructed if they are to be used for rehabilitation purposes, 
that many prisons were overcrowded which made rehabilitation 
impossible, and that rehabilitation programmes have been suspended 
in some correctional centres because of the introduction of new staff 
work shifts (see Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual 
Report 2010/2011 (2011) 6, 13, 35).
Parole and separation of powers
In S v Makena 2011 (2) SACR 294 (GNP), the trial court sentenced 
the appellant to 50 years’ imprisonment and ‘recommended that the 
appellant be considered for parole only after serving 30 years of the 
term of imprisonment’ (at para 3). In setting aside this recommendation, 
the appellate court held (at para 12) as follows:
‘Given the doctrine of separation of powers under the present Constitution, 
… it is best left to the Department of Correctional Services, which forms 
part of the executive arm of government, to determine when the accused 
should be released on parole without any suggestion or recommendation 
in this regard from the court. The Correctional Services Department, which 
functions under the executive branch of government, may not influence, 
nor seek to do so, the courts in their pursuit of the administration of justice. 
Likewise, the courts may not influence Correctional Services in their own 
duties and functions. It is indeed so, and perhaps only human, that a court 
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may view the facts in a case so seriously that it may be of the considered view 
that its abhorrence and desire to protect society from the accused’s conduct 
should be conveyed to Correctional Services. Whilst that may find favour 
with the intellect, it overlooks the fundamental independence of Correctional 
Services which … does not operate from the premise that those convicted by 
the courts and channelled to it are incorrigible and beyond redemption from 
a life of crime, and beyond rehabilitation… [A] recommendation along the 
lines in the sentence on count one should be avoided, and left uninfluenced 
in the hands of the appropriate department.’
The doctrine of separation of powers has been emphasised by the 
Constitutional Court not only in the context of sentencing (S v Dodo 
2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC) at para 26) but also in other areas (recently in 
the area of institutions that are empowered to investigate and detect 
serious crimes – Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at para 80). The question whether a 
court should or should not impose a non-parole period has attracted 
different views from South African courts (cf Mujuzi (2011) 14 PER 
205 at 215–219). It has to be recalled that s 276B(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 expressly allows a court to fix a non-
parole period and s 73(6)(a) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 
1998 requires a prisoner to serve a non-parole period that has been 
ordered by the court. A combined reading of s 276B(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and s 73(6)(a) of the Correctional Services Act means 
that although the court in Makena had fixed a non-parole period 
of 30 years’ imprisonment, the Department of Correctional Services 
could have placed the offender on parole after having served 25 years. 
What is not clear from Makena is why the full bench did not refer to 
s 276B(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act in arriving at its conclusion on 
the question of separation of powers.
In Swart v Minister of Correctional Services and others 2011 (2) 
SACR 217 (WCC) the court dealt with the meaning of the phrase ‘date 
of release’ in section 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977, which provides as follows:
‘Where a person has been sentenced by a court to imprisonment for a period 
– (i) not exceeding five years; or (ii) exceeding five years, but his date of 
release in terms of the provisions of the Correctional Services Act, 1959 (Act 
8 of 1959), and the regulations made thereunder is not more than five years 
in the future, and such a person has already been admitted to a prison, the 
Commissioner or a parole board may, if he or it is of the opinion that such a 
person is fit to be subjected to correctional supervision, apply to the clerk or 
registrar of the court, as the case may be, to have that person appear before 
the court a quo in order to reconsider the said sentence.’
The applicant had brought an application for an order to the effect that 
his sentence should be converted into one of correctional supervision 
in terms of section 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The 
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applicant had been sentenced to an effective sentence of 15 years’ 
imprisonment for theft and two counts of fraud. Basing his argument 
on the case of Price v Minister of Correctional Services 2008 (2) SACR 
64 (SCA) at para 6, in which it was decided that ‘the date from which 
an inmate can be considered to have his sentence converted is the date 
on which he first becomes eligible for parole, or his date of release, 
whichever occurs first’, the applicant asked the court to declare that 
(at para 4)
‘…the date of release referred to in s 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act … means, for the purpose of an inmate subject to the provisions of the 
Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 … relating to his or her placement 
under community corrections, the date on which such prisoner may be 
considered for placement on parole or the date upon which the prisoner may 
be released upon the expiration of his or her sentence, whichever occurs 
first…’
Before discussing the issue before it, the court first considered the 
locus standi of the applicant and held that the ‘the applicant lacks 
jurisdiction to bring such an application, which can only be brought 
by the Commissioner of Correctional Services and Parole Board’ (at 
para 2). The court read s 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act with s 73(1)(a) of the Correctional Services Act which provides 
that ‘a sentenced prisoner remains in prison for the full period of 
sentence’ to hold that ‘these provisions serve to substantiate the fact 
that the legislature intended the date of release of an inmate, for the 
purposes of s 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act, to be the 
date when the term of imprisonment imposed had expired. This is 
evident from s 73(3) of the [Correctional Services] Act’ (at para 22). The 
court concluded (at para 24) with the caution that
‘[a]n inmate is not as a rule automatically entitled to either the benefit of release 
on parole or the consideration for placement on correctional supervision. In 
terms of s 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the CPA, the commissioner exercises a discretion 
as to whether to refer a person to a court for consideration of his sentence, 
and the discretion is dependent on a number of circumstances.’
Some of the factors that the commissioner may put in consideration 
include ‘the length of the sentence and the type of incarceration’ (at 
para 25).
The following are some of the points that can be distilled from 
the Swart decision: first, an inmate does not have standing before 
court in terms of s 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The 
application must be brought either by the commissioner of correctional 
services or the parole board. Secondly, the dictum in Price v Minister 
of Correctional Services, which was decided in the context of the 
Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959, is not applicable to those offenders 
governed by the 1998 Correctional Services Act; thirdly, a prisoner 
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does not have a right and is not entitled to have his sentence converted 
to one of correctional supervision. It is within the discretion of the 
commissioner or the parole board to decide whether or not to make 
an application for the sentence to be converted. In such an application, 
the commissioner or the parole board may take into consideration 
factors that it deems important.
A sentence of imprisonment concurrent with a fine
Section 17(e) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 
provides that ‘Any person convicted of an offence under this Act shall 
be liable …(e) in the case of the offence referred to in section 13(f) 
to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 25 years, or to both such 
imprisonment and such fine as the Court may deem fit to impose.’ In S 
v Gcoba 2011 (2) SACR 231 (KZP) the accused pleaded guilty and was 
convicted by the magistrate of dealing in 13.35 kg of dagga, contrary 
to section 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. The 
magistrate sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment, plus a fine of 
R4 000 or 12 months’ imprisonment (at para 1). On review the issue 
was whether the sentence imposed by the magistrate was a competent 
or appropriate sentence. The High Court observed that ‘[t]he wording 
of … section [17(e)] is somewhat perplexing and ambiguous, and 
as a result is often misconstrued’ (at para 4). It referred to different 
decisions in which that provision has been interpreted differently (see 
S v Mohome 1993 (1) SACR 504 (T); S v Zwane 2004 (2) SACR 291 (N); 
S v Mqikela 2005 (2) SACR 397 (E); S v Msusa D [2009] JOL 23093 
(Tk) – holding that it was mandatory for the court to impose a term of 
imprisonment. The court also referred to the following cases in which 
courts held the view that imprisonment was not mandatory (at paras 
5– 9: S v Fedani 2000 (1) SACR 345 (E); S v Sokweliti 2002 (1) SACR 
632 (Tk); S v Mahlangu 2004 (1) SACR 280 (T)) and held that ‘[f]or 
dealing in dagga in contravention of s 5(b) — on proper construction 
— the penalty clause makes the imposition of a term of imprisonment 
mandatory. Though the section also makes provision for a fine, it 
must be imposed in addition to the sentence of imprisonment, not in 
substitution thereof’ (at para 13). The Court added that ‘[t]hough the 
penalty clause makes provision for the mandatory imposition of the 
sentence of imprisonment for dealing in dagga, it does not preclude 
the total or partial suspension thereof’ (at para 14).
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